November 17th, 2010
Villa Gualino, Room Torino
02.30 p.m.
 

Michele Starnini
Dipartimento di Fisica "E. Fermi", Universita' di Pisa

Recently, the study of strategic games on complex networks has attracted a great interest, in particular focusing on the problem of the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas, which has been addressed mainly within the general framework of evolutionary game theory. In this talk we present and discuss the results of a computational study of the Stag Hunt game on a complex network, built using an evolutionary preferential attachment mechanism. While recent studies introduce dynamics by considering rewiring processes of a pre-existent network, we choose to incorporate an intrinsic feedback between dynamic and topology, as the growth and formation of the network is ruled by the dynamical states of the elements of the system.
We show that in our model the relation between the emergence of cooperation and the topology of the resulting networks is highly non-trivial. The variation of the main parameters involved and the parametrization of the game dynamics strongly affect the model behavior and the structure of the network.